A VERY BAD STATUTE.
The worst criminals have often been defended by able
counsel, whose belief in the innocence of their client has been
very sincere. With this fact itf view', it- is not, pertaps, surprising that one of the learned judges of the Orphans' Court
for the county of Philadelphia, should dissent from the opinion
of the court pronouncing the Act of May I2, 1897, P. L. 56,
guilty of serious offences against the Constitution of the State.
In calling this statute a very bad one, I do not wish to be
understood as condemning it because it is an attempt to lay a
tax upon "Direct Inheritances" so-called. The wisdom of
such a method of raising revenue may be questioned, but it is
undoubtedly quite within the province of the legislature by
proper enactment to prescribe it. But this Act is so faulty in
construction, so clearly subversive of the principles of lawmaking, and so flagrantly in conflict with the Constitution, that
no condemnatory words could be too strong. Let us consider,
first, wherein it is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional
in the following particulars:
I. It conflicts with Art. iii., Sec. 3, which directs that an
Act shall be upon one subject, clearly expressed in its title.
2. It conflicts with Art. ix., Sec. i, which directs that taxes
shall be uniform, etc.
3- It conflicts with Art. ix., Sec. 2, which forbids exemptions from taxation except in certain cases. And it is generally
unconstitutional as being
4. In conflict with the whole intent and purpose of the
third article, which is to secure careful, intelligible legislation.
I.
The Act is entitled "An Act taxing gifts, legacies, and inheritances in certain cases, and providing for the collection
thereof." As a matter of fact, the Act does not tax "inheritances " at all; and it does tax "sales made in contemplation
of the death of the grantor," etc.-a provision not even faintly
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suggested by the title. Moreover, unless we are to disregard
the plain meaning of the English language, the purpose of the
Act is to tax, and provide for the collection of, gifts, legacies,
and inheritances, in certain cases. Such is not the purpose of
the Act ; but had it been, it would have been clearly expressed
by the title. Taking up these three objections to the title in
their order: It will certainly not be pretended by any lawyer
that "inheritance" is a fitting term to describe a " distributive
share under the intestate laws; " itself a well-known term and
easily inserted in the title to an Act. And an Act stated in its
title to be for the imposition of a tax upon " inheritances "
which expressly confines itself to taxing personal property, is
absurdly inconsistent. Surely, even without the constitutional
provision, it should be insisted that a law should be couched
in apt words, and the careless, popular meaning of a term
should not be accepted any more than in instruments between
man and man. Second. There is no expression in the title,
" clear " or otherwise, of an intention to tax "sales " of any
kind; there is nothing in the title to admonish any one that
such a transaction is within the purview of the Act. Third.
As has been said, the title distinctly states one of the purposes
of the Act to be the collection of gifts, etc., whereas it simply
provides the machinery for the collection of the tax imposed.
Now, is all this " mere verbal criticism? " Strictly, yes. Is
it " mere captious verbal criticism ? "

Distinctly, no.

The

wording of the title to an Act has been thought of sufficient
importance to justify the insertion of a proviso in the Constitution-the fundamental, organic law of the State-with
regard to it. " Mere verbal criticism " is all that a title is
susceptible of, and it is not only the right but the duty of the
courts and of the profession to subject titles to strict critici'm._
The words of the constitutional provision (Art. iii., Sec. 3.)
are: '"No bills, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title." If the words, " which shall be clearly
expressed in its title," contain a mandate which cannot be
disregarded, does the title " An Act taxing gifts, legacies and
inheritances in certain cases, and providing for the collection
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thereof" express the real purpose of an Act which might--as
far as its substantive provisions are concerned-be expressed
thus: "An Act imposing a tax on gifts, legacies, sales, and distributive shares under the intestate laws, in certain cases, and
providing for the collection of the said tax?"
It is the
duty of the legislature to " hew to the line" in obedience to
constitutional provisios--quite as-mudih as it is the duty of the
executive or of the judiciary-a truth which is often lost sight
of, apparently. The legislature is the servant of the people,
with most important responsibilities and duties, and clothed
for the benefit of the people, with wide powers; but just as
amenable to constitutional mandates and bound to strict compliance with them as any other servant of the people. Constitutional restrictions upon legislative power have become more
and more numerous as the years have gone on, as the result
of past experience-a very significant fact. So true is this,
that it has been thought that these restrictions have become
too numerous, and as remarked by Mr. Justice Mitchell,
dissenting, Perkins v. Philadelpida, 156 Pa. 569: "In the
impatience of the people with some of the evils of special legislation, they have rushed to the other extreme, and so hedged
about and bound up the legislative arm of the government
that legitimate and necessary powers can be exercised only
with difficulty, if at all." We are so accustomed to the now
well recognized power and duty of the courts to pronounce
upon the constitutionality of a statute, that we are apt to forget that less than a century ago, it was doubted by many, and
denied by some, of the ablest judges that there was any such
power or duty. In Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330, Mr. Chief
Justice Gibson in a long, and of course able, dissenting opinion
(written in 1824), expressly denied such power to the courts.
But he stated twenty years later, during the argument in
Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 281, that he had changed his
opinion for two reasons, "The late convention by their silence
sanctioned the pretensions of the courts to deal freely with the
Acts of the legislature; and from experience of the necessity
of the case." He subsequently declared many an Act unconstitutional ! A relic of the same doctrine still obtains, however,
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in the refusal of the courts to declare an Act unconstitutional
for an alleged neglect on the part of the legislature to conform.
to formal provisions of the Constitution-Art. iii., Sec. 8, for
example-which requires certain classes of Acts to be advertised
for thirty days. See Perkinsv. PI/iladedphia,supra-aposition,
the force of which I never could see-for surely the argument
"ab inconvenienti" ought not be a shield behind which the
legislature can disregard any constitutional provision. But
there is no mistaking the sure and steady growth of the intention of the people to keep the legislature well within bounds:
And no one familiar with early legislation can wonder at this
-the
enormities foisted upon the people in the shape of
statutes, were often grotesquely absurd.
II.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. ix., Sec. i, provides
as follows: "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class
of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws;
but the general assembly may, by general laws, exempt from
taxation public property used for public purposes, actual
places of religious worship, places of burial not used or held
for private or corporate profit, and institutions of purely public
charity." The first section of the Act, after imposing a tax of
two per cent. on certain property, contains two provisos:
First, " Provided That personal property to the amount of five
thousand dollars shall be exempt from the payment of this tax
in all estates; " and second, " Provided, further, That so much
of the estates of persons heretofore deceased as has not actually
been distributed and paid to persons entitled thereto prior to
the passage of this Act, shall be liable to the tax imposed by
this law as well as the estates of persons who die hereafter."
Do these provisos conflict with Art. ix., Sec. I, of the Constitution ? Let us see what is their effect. A. dies, leaving an
estate of $5ooo all to 6ne person; no tax is to be levied upon
this bequest. B. dies, leaving an estate of $6ooo to three
persons; each person's share is taxed $6.66-so that he must
pay a tax for receiving $2000 simply because the whole estate,
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of which his legacy was a part, amounted to more than $5ooo
-while the legatee under the will of A. gets $5000 free of tax,
on account of the (for him) happy accident that his benefactor's
whole estate did not exceed that amount. Again, A. dies
before the passage of the Act; for some reason his estate is
only partially distributed when the Act is passed. A., B. and
C. have received 'their legacies. D. has nitt rbceiede his,
though equally entitled to it. The legacy of D. is taxed,
and those of A., B. and C. are not. These are not only the
indirect effects of the Act, but are its positively and expressly
stated purposes. It is to be noted that the learned and distinguished counsel for the Commonwealth, in the argument
before the Orphans' Court in banc, did not seriously attempt
to prove that this taxation was " uniform." Their contention
was, first, that the Act simply " classified" the subject for
taxation, making one class of estates over $5oo and parts
thereof undistributed at the passage of the Act; and another
class of those portions which were $5000 or less, and such
parts of estates as had been actually distributed "prior to the
passage of this Act." And second,-and this was the plea in
" confession and avoidance" most strenuously urged-that as
this species of taxation was a sort of excise or license tax upon
the right to receive property, and not a tax upon property
itself, (see directly contra, Bittenger's App eal, 129 Pa. 338)
it was not within the scope of constitutional provision as
to uniformity of taxation. If either of these contentions be
well founded, then the first section of the ninth article of the
organic law of the State might as well be expunged-betterfor it is idle to retain an utterly nugatory section. If the
legislature can discriminate between members of one class and
call such discrimination "classification," there is an end to
uniformity at once. If the legislature can impose all manner of
unjust, discriminating taxes, so long as it does so by means of
an "excise, burden, bonus, or assessment," instead of annually,
the people are left without protection ; for legislative ingenuity
will be quite equal to clothing a tax in the form of an excisewhich it has not even taken the trouble to do in this case
-whenever it shall be necessary to accomplish its purpose.
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For example: What is to prevent the imposition of a stamp
tax on all deeds left for record which convey property more
than three acres in extent ? This, according to the Commonwealth's contention, is merely " classifying" real estate into
that which is more and that which is less than three acres in
extent-and, anyhow, it is an excise. tax-levied on the "privilege of taking" the property, and so quite free from constitutional restriction! Without reviewing in extenso the cases in
Pennsylvania upon the subject of legislative classification for
the purposes of taxation-and they are very numerous-it is
sufficient to say that there is no case which even hints at the
propriety of" classifying" by fixing a line of value or extent.
The whole question is fully elaborated in the opinion of the
court in Coin. v. Del., etc., Canal Co., 123 Pa. 594. But we
are not without clear and unmistakable authority--if any were
needed-against this classification. Mr. Justice Paxson, in
Fox's Appeal, I 12 Pa. 355, in speaking of the exceptions in the
Act of 1885, of "notes or bills for work and labor done,"
other notes being taxed, says: "The exception of notes or
bills for work and labor done is clearly a violation of the
ninth article of the Constitution. This belongs to a species
of class legislation that has become very common, more
common than commendable, the object of which is to favor a
particular class at the expense of the rest of the community.
So far as such legislation affects the question of taxation, the
Constitution has put an end to it. There can be no more of
it, nor should there be. The Constitution protects all classes
alike; the poor and the rich equally enjoy its benefits, and all
must share alike the burden which it imposes. However
popular such legislation may be, it cannot be sustained under
our present Constitution." There is no difference in principle
between excepting "notes for work and labor done" and
excepting estates or parts of estates less than $5000. If such
a thing were permitted, there is no knowing to what proportions it might grow. For it can easily be imagined that a
larger exception might be made by subsequent legislationmore "classes" of notes, or " classes" of estates created, until
the whole burden of taxation were thrown upon some persons

A VERY BAD STATUTE.

while others escaped entirely. That there is no likelihood
that this sort of legislation would be carried to any great
excess, if permitted, is no answer to the argument, even if true
in point of fact. The possibility of abuses is what must be
guarded against; and abundant warnings have been given in
the past, that constitutional restraints upon legislation are not
only necessary in theory, but in-practice.
Absolute uniformity-absolute equality-of taxation, is
unattainable. This may be freely conceded; but where by
its very terms, an Act of Assembly provides an un-uniform
tax-and makes, as here, the un-uniform provision the
condition upon which the Act passes-for that is the office of
a proviso-it comes directly in conflict with the Constitution :
And if it did not, the constitutional provision would be an
empty form-vox et praetereanihil.
III.
Even if there were no direction as to uniformity of taxation
in the Constitution, the exemption of estates and parts of
estates less than $5000, would be a clear violation of Sec. 2
Art. ix., expressly declaring void exemptions, except in
specified cases: Fox's Appeal, supra.
To hold this statute guiltless of offence against Art. ix., Secs.
i and 2 of the Constitution, the plainest and most elementary
rules of constitutional construction must be set aside. It is a
fundamental rule of constitutional construction, that the plain
meaning of the words should be taken-a constitution would be
construed "in its plain, untechnical sense," as Mr. Chief Justice
Thompson says in Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. 338, and repeated
warnings have been uttered by the Supreme Court against
construing away the meaning of the Constitution-for example,
in Monongahela NVav. Co. v. Coons., 6 W. & S. 114, Mr.
Chief Justice Gibson, says, "A constitution is made not
particularly for the inspection of lawyers, but for the inspection
of the million, that they may read and discern in it their rights
and their duties; and it is, consequently, expressed in the terms
which are most familiar to them. Words, therefore, which
do not of themselves denote that they are used in a
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technical sense, are to have their plain, popular, obvious and
natural meaning;" Again, Mr. Justice Woodward, says, in
Clase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403 : " Constitutions above all other
instruments are to be read as they are written. Judicial
glosses and refinements are misplaced when laid upon
them.
Carefully considered
judicial implications may,
indeed, be made from time to time in support of statutes,
never to defeat statutes, when suck implications are gTrounded
in the Constitution and tend to accomplish its obvious purpose,
as well as to promote the public welfare." And in referring
to this very article (Art. ix.) of our present Constitution, Mr.
Justice Paxson said in Fox's Appeal, supra, " This provision of
the Constitution is too important and too valuable to be overridden by the legislature,orfritteredaway byjudicialconstruction.
It was intended to, and does, sweep away forever the power
of the legislature to impose unequal burdens upon the people
under the form of taxation." He also said "that an Act
conflicting with it must fall, no matter what the inconvenience to the State."
Applying these principles, can it be said the words of these
sections (Art. ix., Secs. i and 2) are equivalent to " all taxes
except excises, burdens, bonuses, or assessments," etc.-and
"all laws exempting property from taxation-except excises,
burdens, bonuses or assessments . . . shall be void. Except
that the legislature may exempt property above or below a
certain value from taxation, to which other like property may
be subjected." This is precisely what is necessary to support
the Act-nothing more or less. And a layman may be
imagined standing speechless with amazement when he is
told that an Act taxing property in express terms and exempting certain property from taxation does not conflict with the
Constitution-when he is told that " taxation" in the Act and
in the Constitution does not mean the same thing-that "all"
in the Constitution does not mean "all "-That while the only
authority for the imposition is the taxing power, still for the
purpose of his protection, it is not a tax-and while, practically
speaking, there is deducted from property which would otherwise be his two per cent. of its value, he is quite without protec-
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tion against being singled out for this purpose, or being made
one of a very small number of similiar sufferers ; and if he should
also be told that this result has been brought about by
judicial decision, that the plain and obvious meaning both of
the Act and of the Constitution has been "construed" away,
for his undoing, there is no knowing what will be his attitude!
But I humbly trust that this last is far from likelr to. happen.
I cannot believe that the courts of this Commonwealth will
ever so violate all rules of commonsense and honest interpretation. If they do, the consequences are unimaginable. Much
has been said and written about every intendment being made
in favor of the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly ; but it
all amounts simply to this: That the Act like any other
alleged criminal is entitled to the benefit of an honest doubt.
That the courts should go out of their way to aid the legislature in violating the Constitution, of course, will not be
contended for a moment; it is a higher duty to sustain the
Constitution than to sustain a statute. So much for the
constitutionality of the Act-and by way of transition to the
subject of its wretched character, apart from all constitutional
questions, I may add that when an Act is faulty and full of
imperfections, it is a very good reason for making but little
effort to sustain it, if it can constitutionally be set aside. This
will be urged more at length, later on.
The distinguished counsel for the Commonwealth in the
argument before the Orphans' Court in banc, frankly stated
that the Act had been formed by copying the collateral
inheritance tax law, mutatis mutandis, and adding a little here
and there. The trouble about the method of procedure is that
unless almost impossible care is exercised, the mutanda will
not all be mutata, and the result will be a highly unsatisfactory
jumble. The title to the Act tells us, as we have seen, that it
is for the purpose of taxing legacies, etc., and providing for
their collection. By a sort of sub-title its last section (Sec. 16)
tells us that the law shall be known as the direct inheritance
law, and shall not be held to change the collateral inheritance
tax law, it being the intention of the Act "to impose a direct
inheritance tax on all estates or parts of estates not subject to
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the Act or Acts providing for the collection of collateral
inheritance taxes." Apart from this-which simply tells how
the Act is not to be construed, and what its intention is-we
should never have imagined the Act to be for such a purpose.
The first section, by which the tax is imposed, draws no distinction whatever between lineals and collaterals, and standing
by itself, it would simply impose a tax of two per cent. upon
the personalty of all estates no matter whether they passed to
lineals or collaterals. And more than this, it expressly imposes this tax upon corporations as well as natural persons.
By section 9 it is made the duty of the Register of Wills to
appoint an appraiser to value estates subject to direct inheritance tax. Thus far in the Act, remember, there is not a word
to indicate any distinction between lineals and collaterals. By
section 2 interest is expressly imposed upon estates of persons
dying, no matter how long ago, if the tax is not paid within
one year: See opinion of Penrose. J., Portuondo'sEst., 54 Leg.
Int. 3 16, et seq. The Act imposes a tax of two per cent. upon
personal property passing, etc., without distinction, as we have
said, between lineals and collaterals, and exempting estates or
parts of estates $5000 or less. Section 16 says it is intended
to tax all estates not taxed by the collateral inheritance tax
law. This would include: i. Real estate; 2. The whole estate
over $250. So that the Act and its "interpreting sections,"
so to speak, do not agree. It does not do what it is expressly
stated that it was intended to do. It does do that which it is,
inferentially, at least, declared not to intend doing. I say
"inferentially" because all that is expressly stated is, that the
Act shall be known as the direct inheritance law, the inference
being that it only refers to direct inheritances. It is declared
that the Act shall not be held to alter the existing law in reference to the collection of collateral inheritance taxes. If this
merely means that the Act is not intended as an amendment
to the collateral inheritance law, well and good. But if it
means that the, plain words of the substantive sections of the
Act are to be disregarded, the meaning of the language set
aside, and a new and strained meaning put on them by the
courts, then this is something the legislature has no power to
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do. It cannot throw upon the courts the duty of legislation.
It cannot in the body of an Act use a convenient form of
words and then direct the courts to give these words a wholly
different meaning, or to refise to give them their real meaning.
It has been said tim without number that the interpretation
of the law is for the court, without instruction from the legislature. It is true that -wherewords-are doubtful, and the Act
has not been judicially interpreted, prior to the Constitution of
1874, the legislature might have passed an expository Act.
But where, as here, the words of the Act are not doubtful
(the first section is a perfectly clear imposition of a tax), such
an Act, even prospectively, would not have been valid. In
O'Connor v. Warner, 4 W. & S. 223, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson
said that "a legislative direction to perform a judicial function in
a particular way would be a direct violation of the Constitution, which assigns to each organ of the government its
exclusive function and a limited sphere of action:" See, also,
Haley v. Philadelphia,68 Pa. 45. It is true that the direction
to interpret is in a section of the Act to be interpreted, in this
case-but in principle, there can be no difference-It is manifestly absurd for the legislature to direct by the last section
of an Act, that its substantive sections shall be held to have a
meaning their words do not convey. In short, in order to
sustain this Act, the court must read out of it express words,
and read into it others, so that this Act, as it stands in the
statute book, will not express its meaning at all! When this
is necessary, an Act must fall of its own weight. A law is a
rule of action, and the law-making organ of the government
cannot send down a mass of words under the form of an
enactment, and throw upon the courts the necessity of making
it an intelligible rule. The people of this Commonwealth
have prescribed in their Constitution by its third article, great
care on the part of the legislature in passing bills. It is
required that all bills shall go to a committee, shall be read
three times, that no bill shall be amended simply by reference
to its title, etc. ; and a confused, contradictory, inaccurate
enactment, bearing evidence on its face of careless preparation,
is a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, although the
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letter of it may have been complied with. And in such a
case no intendment should be made to sustain an Act-the
courts should rather see to it that the Act shall fall if it in
any way, no matter how slightly, specifically conflicts with
the Constitution. This article is already much too long. I cannot, therefore, do more than mention the attempt to make a
substantive clause out of a proviso (the second in the first
section of the act), and the fact that in some jurisdictions,
under other Constitutions, taxes of this character even when not
uniform, seem to have been sustained-the mistakes of others
should be no guide to us.
In this age of the world, the law is intended to be a system
of rules by which we live, move, and have our being, in civilized
communities; not a body of abstract propositions for skilful
debate and intellectual exercise among lawyers. " I have left
all my property to my rascally nephew in express terms,"
said a cynical old gentleman the other day, "so as to be sure
that he will never get a penny of it." Jests of this sort always
have an underlying cause. And they certainly point to a
more straightforward, commonsense, practical interpretation of
the law, as one of the demands of the people of to-day.
To me, the Act in question seems facile princeps among the
recent examples of bad legislation, and its contemplation leads
me to exclaim " I am sick when I do look on thee ! "
Lucius S. Landreth.
Philadelphia, January t898.

